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ABSTRACT 
 
This note sets out some tentative thoughts concerning regulation, based on my own 
experience and that of a few others who worked in the City of London during the 
transition from the ‘Old City’ to the ‘New City’.2 It was originally written as a 
background paper to discussions in the Harvard/LSE Workshop 2009 on ‘Risk 
Management: Islamic Economic and Islamic-Ethico Legal Perspectives on the 
Current Financial Crisis’. 
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I. THE (WRONG?) PATH OUT OF CHAOS 
In the initial stages of a new crisis, chaos reigns. Out of that chaos comes consensus, 
on the main issues of the crisis, its origins, and its solution. The consensus becomes 
an orthodoxy, the orthodoxy becomes history. All too often, though, that consensus is 
defective. The result is that the solution is also defective. 
There is some evidence that a consensus is already forming on the present crisis. In 
the media and beyond, we hear little but blame of ‘greedy’ bankers and, surprisingly 
late in the development of the consensus, some criticism of governments and other 
authoritative state institutions, such as the central banks. (The relative paucity of 
criticism of state institutions is curious, particularly in the UK, the Prime Minister of 
which, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, presided over the system for ten years.) The 
occasional plea, such as that made by the Archbishop of Canterbury in December last 
year, for a consideration of more general and more fundamental causes, such as the 
state of our moral values, is rare. And, of course, his comments were immediately 
brushed aside by the Prime Minister.3 
Some commentators go back further in time (perhaps to avoid criticising a Labour 
government?) and attribute responsibility to Margaret Thatcher for ‘deregulating’. 
To someone who lived through the changes of the early Thatcher years and their 
effects in the City of London, this distribution of blame, even if corrected to ensure 
that the politicians and other policy makers take their fair share, is curious. Moreover, 
it may be harmful if, taken in combination with a lack of appreciation of some 
fundamentals of regulation, it leads us into the false conclusion that we need more 
behavioural regulation. For blame results in all too often to the desire to control 
behaviour via rules. But such control does not work. 
Before considering this issue in more detail, consider some historical background. 
 
II THE OLD ORDER, MARGARET THATCHER AND RONALD REAGAN 
As is well-known, back in the 1970s United Kingdom the old order still dominated. 
Based on conservativism in both its political and more general sense, socially the 
system was founded on privilege and tradition. 
This old order was very much in evidence in finance and in the professions generally. 
They were characterised by caution, separation of functions and small players. 
Institutional and transactional systems were quite simple and, given the small size of 
the players, fairly easily controlled by management, such as it was. The dominant 
group was the ‘Old Boy Network’, a small closed community of people from the 
British ruling classes. These men (women were entirely unknown until the very end of 
the period, and even then were very few in number and had almost no influence) had 
shared attitudes, knew each other, had often been to school together. The behaviour of 
the Old Boys was based on trust, and when the need arose largely controlled by social 
norms, with hardly any formal regulation. ‘Verbum pactum meum’ (my word is my 
bond) may well have been to some extent an old-fashioned marketing tool, but it 
contained a significant element of truth. Clients were, usually, also Old Boys. 
Business was based on relationships; when I first joined a city firm in 1983, that firm 
                                                 
3 For another example of a more reflective approach, see Caldwell, C (2008) 'Time for Some Morality 
Trades' Financial Times, 19 December 2008. 
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had a very stable client base, which changed extremely slowly, and the idea of a law 
firm bidding for work was unheard of. Problems such as difficulties of risk 
management were either dealt with by means of simple prudential principles, such as 
‘Never lend against security’ (in other words, when you enter into a financial 
transaction, do so for good commercial reasons, do not do so because you consider 
you can get your money back), lending to those able to repay, and so forth. The 
opportunities for profits were relatively modest and, although there were crises and 
mistakes, the risks were relatively modest as well. Generally safe, if rather dull. 
 
For many decades, the only alternative model seemed to be that of socialism, relying 
on cooperative and egalitarian ideas, but with a high degree of control and totalitarian, 
oppressive regimes. 
 
Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan,  of course, changed all that. Inspired largely 
by the thoughts of authors such as Friedrich Hayek, they rejected both models.4 
‘Freedom’ in a right-wing sense, freedom of opportunity, meritocracy, admiration for 
innovation, a ‘practical’, technocratic approach to education, a reliance on property 
rights and their popularisation (a property-owning democracy) and reliance on market 
forces. And for Thatcher, the US model (in a ‘grass is always greener on the other 
side’ version distorted by a failure to understand fully all the facets of that system and 
its locally situated causes and dynamics) was the road to this new heaven. The goal, 
and what came to be for many, was material advancement, which was to be available 
for anyone prepared to work hard enough to achieve it. (It must be stressed here that 
the ‘greed is good’ idea would probably have horrified Thatcher.)5 
 
In this view of the world, it seemed that competition was the natural order of things, 
the impetus for all progress, and the universal panacea, the answer to all our woes. 
The old order was aristocratic, exclusionary, static and fuddy-duddy. Cooperation and 
control were socialist and therefore anathema. Also implicit was the idea that 
principles of professionalism and service were, at least partially, excuses for 
restrictive practices, and had to be modified in the name of a more ‘commercial’ 
attitude. Hence the present system of free competition in free markets, in which it was 
envisaged that everyone would have the chance of becoming rich by hard work and 
ingenuity, which was at a premium, because it could solve any problem. The job of 
legal and accounting professionals was to provide a commercially oriented service to 
their clients. 
 
The outcome was a new environment. The Old Boy Network disappeared or had its 
importance greatly reduced in many areas. In the 1986 ‘Big Bang’, the London Stock 
Exchange saw the old small firms replaced by large institutions, which quickly came 
to dominate the market. Most such institutions were foreign and staffed by a disparate 
group of people who did not know or trust each other. Relationships were replaced by 
transactions. Trust and social control of behaviour were replaced by formal regulation 
of transactions – lots and lots of it, such as the Financial Services Act 1986 and the 
numerous volumes it spawned. 
 
                                                 
4 Notably The Road to Serfdom, The Constitution of Liberty and Law, Legislation and Liberty. 
5 Stone, O (director), Wall Street, 1987. The full quotation is: ‘greed, for want of a better word, is 
good’. The phrase was inspired by a speech by Ivan Boesky’s commencement address at the UC 
Berkeley's School of Business Administration on 18 May 1986. 
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Structural divides, such as the division between brokers and jobbers in the Stock 
Exchange, were abolished. The new players traded on their own account as principal 
as well as agent for others. Other financial roles, formerly clearly separated, were 
blurred as a result with, for example, brokers and corporate financiers in the same 
firm, leading to clear conflicts of interest, with corporate financiers, who wished to 
see their issuing client’s stock placed for the sake of the financiers’ commission, 
putting illegitimate pressure on brokers to place that stock regardless of its value to 
the investor clients of the broking arm. The ‘Chinese Walls’ which were supposed to 
stop such practices, relying on the respect of the rules by those involved, often did not 
work. In the US, we saw the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act. 
 
Complexity increased vastly, because problems could be solved by ingenuity: for 
example, the emergence of swaps and other such instruments, the extension of 
commodity futures to financial futures and the invention of a new term, ‘derivatives’ 
to cover a plethora of new contractual financial instruments, exploded. 
 
People came into areas they knew little or nothing about, and tried to substitute 
decades, sometimes generations of institutional expertise by formal training. 
Commodity futures, for example, was for centuries the preserve of small groups of 
people with self-perpetuating dynamics and institutional knowledge and experience of 
the field. The new derivates were traded by personnel of the large institutions with no 
such knowledge or experience. 
 
It has been rightly pointed out that one of the problems is that financial institutions do 
not just hedge for themselves and their clients, in other words use derivatives to 
transfer risk, but trade on their own account, in other words take that risk on. Just as 
germane, perhaps, are the differences between the present environment and that of the 
Old City. In the old system, ‘Commodity Futures’ related to commodities which had a 
practical use and therefore in nearly all circumstances would have some value. The 
futures contracts were largely traded on exchanges with a clearing house system by, 
on the one hand, users of the commodities who wished to divest themselves of the risk 
of price fluctuation and, on the other, speculators who were prepared to take on that 
risk. And nearly everyone involved was well aware of the way in which the system 
worked and its dangers. In the new system, the underlying asset had only a 
metaphysical existence and the risk of its being worth nothing was more significant. 
 
The transformation from Old City to New City, from Old Boy Network to 
International Anonymity, can be compared to giving alcohol away for free, while at 
the same time passing laws to control its abuse. The problem is that such attempts to 
control behaviour in an environment in which temptation is rife are doomed to failure. 
 
III. REGULATION 
Regulation, or the lack of it, is always mentioned, whether in the context of the 
problems of proposed solution. This concept is used by many people, particularly 
journalists and politicians, without adequate consideration of its definition, underlying 
principles or difficulties. 
Pointless if it is not enforced; problems of capture by the regulated (Enron); 
groupthink; and political pressure/lobbying (often via related parties, duality of 
function). 
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A broad distinction might be made between systemic regulation and behavioural 
regulation. The distinction and the terminology are both crude, but may be of some 
use. Put baldly and, once again, crudely, systemic regulation can be effective; 
behavioural regulation, particularly if it is enacted in a poorly conceived systemic 
environment, has severe limitations. Indeed, it may create more problems than it 
solves. 
Contrary to much of what has been written recently about the lack of regulation, we 
have, in the past few decades, created a plethora of regulation, a veritable paradise for 
regulators, and groups of people, such as regulators themselves, specialist lawyers and 
academics, with vested interests in regulation. There is no evidence that any of it 
works. The more ‘sophisticated’, ie complicated, you make the regulatory regime, the 
more difficult it is to understand for the regulated and the regulators, so the more 
difficult it is to make workable and enforce. It creates more and more expense for the 
operations of the honest and principled participants, with the cost being transmitted to 
their clients. It does not induce more honest or more principled behaviour. 
 
We need to distinguish here between two types of regulation. The first, the type just 
described, is behavioural regulation. The second is systemic regulation, of which 
more in a moment. The fundamental problem with behavioural regulation is that it 
assigns far too much effectiveness to the law, relying on what one might call the 
‘magic wand’ effect. Pass a law and it will be effective. We know, though, that this is 
not how the law actually works. Behavioural regulation has a role, but it is mainly one 
of backing up social norms, serving as a line of last resort. For example, most of us do 
not refrain from killing each other because murder is a crime, but because our 
upbringing and other social controls prevent us. Attempts to solve the problem by 
more regulation in fact exacerbate it, as the legal regime becomes ever more 
unwieldy, remote and incomprehensible to regulated and regulators alike, and 
presents more opportunities for deception and manipulation by the truly fraudulent. 
The main effect of a highly complex regulatory system is to increase expense to the 
end-user. 
 
Essentially, behavioural regulation is premised on the assumption that humans can be 
reprogrammed by law. This is not true. 
 
Nor will an appeal to morality work either; an alcohol abuser will not be prevented 
from drinking by telling her that it is wrong. 
 
Systemic regulation, on the other hand, has more chance of success. Systemic 
regulation could be designed to remove the alcohol, or at any rate make it available 
only to those who are less likely to abuse it. Examples include conservative asset 
ratios and the separation of functions. 
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